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ABSTRACT

The interaction effects among organizational commitment, perceived personal efficacy, and expectations with respect to the impact of collective bargaining are explored in relation to their effect on the degree of faculty support for collective bargaining. Data for the analysis was derived from approximately 1,450 full-time faculty in California State University and Colleges (CSUC) in 1976. An empirical analysis was conducted to estimate the parameters of an expectancy-value model on the full sample and to assess the statistical, and relative importance of the causal variables, and to consider the within-groups salience of the various expectations for the faculty catagorized according to felt efficacy and also according to commitment, in order to discern possible interaction effects. Discussions are presented on the theoretical model and hypothesis, the empirical analysis, the interaction effects, the interaction of efficacy and expectation, and the interaction of commitment and expectation. (SPG)

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INTERACTION OF EFFICACY, COMMITMENT, AND EXPECTATIONS IN FACULTY ATTITUDE FORMATION

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Research on university governance is becoming increasingly sophisticated.[1] This trend appears to have been stimulated by the collective bargaining phenomenon. The "shared authority" model which dominated thinking about university governance for a generation was grounded essentially in normative arguments, and had little or no empirical support. The early work on collective bargaining--in the 1960s and early 1970s--tended to be characterized by one or more of the following orientations: (1) a normative perspective (collective bargaining as "good" or "bad"); (2) efforts to develop conceptual explanations of the trend to bargaining either by suggesting particular explanatory factors, or by proposing models which might encompass explanations for that trend (e.g., the university as a political system); and (3) attempts to develop empirically based explanations of support for collective bargaining, but using simplistic methodologies.

More recent work is more sophisticated in that attention has shifted to: (1) identifying key causal factors; (2) examining interrelationships among such factors; and (3) the use of multivariate statistical techniques. Yet much of this empirically oriented work suffers from a failure to ground empirical investigation and analysis in adequate theory. This may be due, in part, to a tendency to view universities and their employees as singular phenomena without parallels in other institutional contexts. We agree with Smart and Morstain (1975), who have argued that the study of the attitudes and behavior of university personnel should be better integrated with the study of human behavior in organizations in general. Whatever the reason for the inadequate integration of conceptual and empirical work, we do not believe that the theory of university governance can be much advanced by studies which throw a bunch of independent variables into the multivariate analysis hopper and then report what squeezes out.

Much of the work that <u>is</u> grounded in general theory of motivation and job satisfaction relies upon needs satisfaction theories (Begin, 1976, summarizes much of this work). Such theories suffer from a number of conceptual deficiencies which cast considerably doubt upon their value for explanatory or predictive purposes (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). The use of needs satisfaction theories also tends to be associated with a failure to take into account nonlinear interaction effects among key causal

variables which may substantially affect the process of attitude formation. Recent studies have indicated that such effects warrant further investigation (Kaslow and Glacquinta, 1977; Mortimer, Gunne, and Leslie, 1976).

Our general position, then, is that research on university governance--and, in particular, on collective bargaining in higher education--should be both grounded in good theory, and utilize appropriately sophisticated methodology, Nixon's (1975) work provides an appropriate example.

In this paper, we use a model based on the expectancy-value paradigm of attitude formation and motivation, as modified by recent work in attribution theory. This theoretical perspective has been shown to have considerable explanatory value (Fishbein, 1963; Salancik, 1977; Staw, 1977; Vroom, 1964). We derive a number of hypotheses from this theoretical perspective, and test them using appropriate statistical techniques. In particular, we explore interaction effects among organizational commitment, perceived personal efficacy, and expectations with respect to the impact of collective bargaining--as these affect degree of faculty support for collective bargaining.

Data for the present analysis are derived from responses to a survey questionnaire mailed to a randomly drawn sample of faculty in the California State University and Colleges (CSUC) in 1976. Of 3000 questionnaires, approximately 1500 were returned. Our data are derived from the responses from full-time faculty: approximately 1450. Since our data are drawn from the faculty of one university system, the usual caution with respect to generalizability must be exercised and our analysis viewed as exploratory. The contextual characteristics of the CSUC have been analyzed in detail elsewhere (Walker, 1974), and will not be restated here. However, it is necessary to point out the distinction between the United Professors of California (UPC), an affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers, and the Congress of Faculty Associations (CFA). The latter is a coalition of the CSUC affiliates of the American Association of University Professors, the California State Employees' Association, and the National Education Association. UPC and CFA are in competition for exclusive bargaining agent rights when the opportunity for a representation election is available.

Theoretical Model and Hypotheses

We now explore the impact of organizational commitment, perceived personal efficacy, and expectations with respect to the impact of collective bargaining on degree of support for the implementation of collective bargaining in the CSUC.

An analysis of covariance approach is used to examine this relationship in two ways. First, we consider the additive effects of efficacy, commitment, and expectations on support for bargaining under the assumptions of an expectancy-value model of attitude formation. Second, we estimate the parameters of this model for different subgroups of faculty, categorized according to felt efficacy and commitment, and investigate differences in the values of the regression coefficients across subgroups. We draw several tentative conclusions regarding the differential saliency of expectations across subgroups. We conclude that faculty with high commitment to the organization evaluate collective bargaining differently in some respects than those with low commitment, and that faculty with a strong sense of personal efficacy or control evaluate collective bargaining differently than those with weak sense of personal efficacy.

Within the expectancy-value paradigm of attitude formation and motivation, motivation to engage in a behavior (vote favorably with respect to collective bargaining) is viewed as a function of attitude toward the behavior object (support for bargaining). Attitude, in turn, is considered to be a function of the expectations of certain outcomes times the valence of those outcomes to the individual. In our survey, we elicited responses concerning the expected impact of both the UPC and the CFA on a wide variety of possible outcomes. We constructed an overall index for each expectation category by summing the UPC and CFA items. While there is a tendency for faculty to differentiate between the CFA and UPC for some outcomes, factor analysis generally supported the validity of our assumption that the CFA and UPC items serve as indicators of a general expectation concerning the impact of bargaining for the issue in questions.

Based on conceptual grounds and preliminary data analysis, we

selected a set of eight categories of expectations items. This set incorporates the conceptual distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards from employment. The eight categories have also been shown, in other research, to be associated with faculty attitudes toward collective bargaining (Begin, 1976). These are the expectations that collective bargaining will lead to:

1) increases in salaries;
2) a decrease in the effectiveness of the faculty senate;
3) an increase in conflict between faculty and the administration;
4) the intervention into CSUC affairs by outside union leaders (i.e. state and national officers of the faculty organizations);
5) an increase in personal efficacy;
6) an increase in resources to the system received from the state government;
7) improvements in the quality and equity for faculty personnel decisions;
8) improvements in the quality of educational programs in the CSUC.

The regression equation used in this analysis is:

$$CB = a + \sum_i b_i E_i + e \qquad (1)$$

where:

CB = support for collective bargaining;

a = intercept;

b_i = regression coefficient;

E_i = expectation that outcome "i" will occur under collective bargaining;

e = error term.

Equation (1) deviates from the usual expectancy model in two ways: (a) we do not explicitly include an outcome value term; (b) we estimate the coefficients for individual expectations rather than for a summed, expected value index. However, it should be clear that the regression coefficients serve as measures of expectation saliency, so that:

$$b_i = (\bar{s})(v_i) \qquad (2)$$

where:

$\bar{s}$ = a scaling factor (constant for all b_i);

v_i = valence for outcome i (assumed constant for all subjects).

Therefore, Equation (1) is functionally equivalent to:

$$CB = a + \bar{s} \left(\sum_i v_i E_i\right) + e \qquad (3)$$

Equation (3) is the usual specification of the expectancy-value model. Since the scaling factor is assumed constant for all b_i, then variations in the values of the coefficients will represent variations in the valences of the outcomes. In making intergroup comparisons for a given expectation, differences in the values of the regression coefficients will represent differences in the valence of the outcome in question across groups (i.e., if the value of the regression coefficient for salary is less for high stake than for low stake faculty, then we may infer that nontenured faculty value salary increases more heavily than tenured faculty).

One confounding factor is that the value represented by v_i may represent both balence of an outcome and the perceived appropriateness of collective bargaining for obtaining that outcome. Since we do not have current satisfaction measures for all of the outcomes used in this study, it is not possible to differentiate between the outcome valence and appropriateness components. Therefore, a weaker assumption, which does not interfere with the central focus of our study, is that v_i represents an evaluative weighting placed on expectation "i," which represents both the valence of the outcome and the perceived appropriateness of bargaining for obtaining the outcome.

Commitment may be defined as "the binding of the individual to behavioral acts" (Salancik, 1977). It is argued, by those who view behavior in the organization as largely externally controlled, that actions that bind the individual to an organization will both make the individual more likely to behave in ways congruent with organizational norms and objectives and also induce changes in perceptions and beliefs in order to establish consonance between behaviors and cognitions. These perceptual changes will impact on future behavior to the extent that such behavior is discretionary. Several factors may lead to commitment to an organization but these factors have properties in common. Commitment requires that the act of commitment be both voluntary and revocable only at substantial

cost (either in terms of social sanctions or the loss of personal resources). Since we assume that the decision to enter the CSUC is voluntary, we define commitment by focusing on the cost aspects. We have used two indicators of these costs: the individual's stake or investment in the organization and the perceived opportunity costs of leaving the organization. Stake or investment is often defined in terms of length of service in the organization. Since we are dealing with university faculty, tenure status provides a convenient tool for differentiating between "high" stake and "low" stake individuals. We define the former group as tenured faculty and the latter group as nontenured faculty. We derive perceived opportunity costs for leaving from a questionnaire item in which faculty were asked how favorably they perceive job opportunities outside of the CSUC. Those who responded that the labor market appeared to be excellent to fair are defined as the high mobility group; those who saw it as poor or very poor are defined as the low mobility group.

We would expect commitment to affect both: (1) the strength of support for bargaining; and (2) the saliency of expectations regarding the impact of collective bargaining in determining support for bargaining. With respect to the first hypothesis, we would expect the degree of commitment to be positively associated with both the extent of an individual's social integration within an organization and the centrality of the organization and its rewards for participation in the individual's life. Since collective bargaining serves as a means for influencing organizational decisions and the distribution of rewards in the direction of the faculty, we would expect the centrality of these rewards to the more committed individual to result in greater support for bargaining.

This effect may be confounded by a faculty member's sense of professionalism. Thus, Gress (1976), in a study of three Ohio institutions, has argued that senior faculty tend to be opposed to bargaining in part because: (1) they have "discovered the rewards or satisfactions . . . in exclusive attention to professional activities, especially research and authorship"; and (2) they are "constrained by traditional assumptions and stereotyped perspectives about higher education" (pp. 254-255). They are disinclined to become agents of fundamental institutional changes. However, in a study of faculty in a school of education, Kazlow and Giacquinta (1977) found that senior faculty tend to be much more supportive of collective bargaining than their nontenured colleagues. They attribute

this to the discomfort among senior faculty resulting from an institutional shift from a teaching-oriented to a research-oriented mission and consequent changes in the rewards system. They support collective bargaining because they expect it to result in a defense of their security. We would argue in the CSUC context that: (1) in a teaching-oriented institution, most faculty do not discover the joys of research and authorship; (2) in a system characterized by continuous, intensive conflict (Walker, 1974), faculty members tend to learn through experience that the "traditional assumptions and stereotyped perspectives about higher education" which they might have held when they left graduate school do not hold. The overall effect is for length of service to be associated with the development of a "local" rather than a "cosmopolitan" orientation; and this "local" orientation is associated with a growing inclination to become associated with fundamental institutional changes.

A second point with respect to the relationships between commitment and strength of support for bargaining is that the more socially integrated the individual is into the organization, the more likely that he will adopt prevailing sentiments with respect to bargaining. Since faculty in the CSUC have tended to favor collective bargaining for several years, we would expect the more committed faculty to be more favorably inclined toward bargaining. As to the additive impact of the indicators of commitment we have included in this study, we hypothesize that: (1) tenured faculty will be more supportive of bargaining than nontenured faculty; and (2) low-mobility faculty will be more supportive of bargaining than high-mobility faculty.

In terms of the <u>interaction</u> of commitment and expectations, we would expect highly committed faculty to place greater weight on those expectations that relate to the impact of collective bargaining on organizational goal attainment, the integrity of the organization, and the intrinsic rewards of organizational participation than do low commitment faculty. Conversely, we would anticipate that those with a low commitment to the organization would place greater weight on the expected impact of collective bargaining on the extrinsic rewards of employment than do high commitment faculty. These propositions derive from compliance theory, according to which individuals tend, over time, to become socialized

to accept the norms of the organization and to legitimize its goals--as they are increasingly exposed to an enlarged set of obligations and duties, and to the values and expectations of their co-workers. Such individuals become increasingly bound to the organization, and experience an increasing sense of responsibility to the organization and of investment in its well-being. Those who have not been exposed to a lengthy period of socialization tend to have a more narrowly drawn commitment, and to view organizational participation in more instrumental terms.

The significance of perceived efficacy is rooted in both political sociology (Gamson, 1968), and the theory of psychological reactance (Staw, 1977). The concept of efficacy refers to individuals' perceptions of their ability to influence decisions that affect them. Our hypotehsis here is that low efficacy faculty will be more supportive of collective bargaining than will high efficacy faculty. The theoretical justification for this hypothesis derives from the proposition from the theory of psychological reactance that when control is reduced, or expectations of and aspirations for control are not met, individuals will react to attempt to (re)assert control over behavior-contingent outcomes. Since collective bargaining is a form of system change, and support for change is a form of reactance to the absence of control, support for bargaining should be a decreasing function of felt efficacy. We measure efficacy by using a questionnaire item covering degree of satisfaction with one's personal influence over decisions. Faculty were divided into high and low efficacy groups, the latter consisting of those who are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with this item.

Beyond the preceding hypothesis, we would expect to find interaction effects between felt efficacy and <u>expectations</u> that the implementation of collective bargaining will lead to increased efficacy (that is, facilitate re-assertion of control over outcomes). Such expectations would be consistent with the widely accepted interpretation of collective bargaining as a mechanism for power equalization. Our hypothesis here is that low efficacy faculty, in evaluating the desirability of collective bargaining, will put greater emphasis on expectations of increased efficacy as an outcome of bargaining than will the high efficacy group.

Empirical Analysis

Our empirical anslysis is conducted in two stages. First, we estimate the parameters of the model on our full sample and assess the statistical significance and relative importance of the causal variables. We include the eight expectation items and the dummy variables, efficacy (high/low), stake (tenure/nontenure) and mobility (high mobility/low mobility). Second, we consider the within-groups salience of the various expectations for the faculty categorized according to felt efficacy and also according to commitment, in order to discern possible interaction effects.

We find that the coefficients of the expectation items are all significant and of the expected signs (Table 1). That is, the expectation that collective bargaining will improve the quality of educational programs, increase resources to the CSUC, improve the equity of personnel decisions, increase personal efficacy, and increase salaries all are positively related to support for bargaining. Conversely, the expectations that collective bargaining will lead to increased influence of outside union leaders into CSUC affairs, a decrease in the influence of the faculty senate and increased levels of conflict all are negatively related to support for bargaining. The strongest of these items are the resource improvement and the equity of personnel decisions expectations.[2] The weakest of these items are the salary and conflict expectations. While the expectations that collective bargaining will increase salaries and increase resources to the system are correlated (n=.40), the latter item reflects a concern for a wide variety of issues and suggests that faculty place greater emphasis on the implications of increased resources for improving organizational quality than they do on the allocation of those resources to increasing salaries.

The strong effect of expected improvements in the equity of personnel decisions (relative to the salary expectation) supports the hypothesis found in the general industrial relations literature that unionism and collective bargaining are viewed by employees more as a kind of insurance policy against capricious and arbitrary treatment by management than as an instrument for increasing earnings and other forms of

remuneration (Van de Vall, 1972). That is, the union is seen as an advocate of employee rights, and as functioning as a hedge against threats to employment conditions, while the function of negotiating salary increases is of secondary importance.

With respect to the main effects of mobility, stake, and efficacy, we find that while efficacy and mobility are significant and of the expected signs (Table 1), stake has no significant main effect. Efficacy has by far the strongest effect of any of the variables in the model. With respect to organizational commitment, therefore, we find that social integration processes and level of investment in the organization, as implicit in the stake variables, are not relevant in generating support for bargaining. As we have noted above, other research dealing with the impact of tenure on support for bargaining has generated mixed findings. However, a faculty member's perceived opportunity for leaving the organization does impact on support for bargaining. The crucial commitment generating variable that affects support for bargaining, therefore, is the individual's sense of the adverse consequences that will result from leaving the organization vis-a-vis his investment in and socialization to the organization. This suggests that perceived entrapment and its attendant frustration lead to support for bargaining, a proposition with support in the general unionism and labor-management conflict literature.

Interaction Effects

We now focus on the interaction of expectations with efficacy and commitment. We first consider two-way interaction effects by using an analysis of covariance design. The parameters of the motivational model presented above were reestimated for subcategories of faculty. We first examine the interaction between expectations and efficacy by dividing our sample into a high efficacy and a low efficacy group. The interaction between expectations and commitment is assessed by estimating the parameters of the model using three commitment categories: (1) low stake/high mobility; (2) high stake/high mobility; and (3) high stake/low mobility. A fourth category, low stake/low mobility, although conceptually interesting, is omitted due to a very small sample size (n=42), which precluded obtaining efficient estimators.[3]

Interaction of Efficacy and Expectations

We have argued for and presented empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that support for collective bargaining is a form of reactance to a sense of lack of control over behavior-contingent outcomes (Staw, 1977). While there is a significant, positive relationships also between the expectation that bargaining will lead to an increase in personal efficacy and support for bargaining (Table 2), we would anticipate that the saliency of the efficacy expectation will be greater for faculty with a low sense of efficacy than for those with a high sense of efficacy. That is, the weaker the sense of control one has within the organization, the more valued will be the outcome of increased control. The regression coefficient for this expectation in the case of the high efficacy group is less than the coefficient for the low efficacy group, as hypothesized (Table 2). The difference is significant at the .05 level.

Another substantial difference between the high and the low efficacy group is with respect to the weighting placed on the expectation that collective bargaining will lead to an increase in resources to the system. The high efficacy group clearly weights this expectation more heavily than the low efficacy group and the difference is significant at the .05 level. High efficacy faculty may view such an increase in resources as the basis for an opportunity to exercise that control and influence the allocation process. Although low efficacy faculty may see increased resources as potentially improving the organization, they are more apt to feel removed from the allocation decision-making process, and the expectation will consequently be less salient.

Low efficacy faculty place greater weight on the expectation that collective bargaining will generate intrusions into the affairs of the CSUC by those outside the system, especially union leaders (significant at the .10 level). If a faculty member already perceives of himself as lacking control and influence over decisions that affect his life, then he may view this intrusion of outsiders as even further reducing the opportunity to exercise control. He may see the locus of effective decision making as becoming even more removed from him than it already seems to be since considerations external to the organization, and decision makers external to the organization, will be of substantial importance in

controlling intraorganizational affairs.

Finally, high efficacy faculty appear to place greater emphasis on the expectation that bargaining will improve the quality of educational programs in the CSUC than do low efficacy faculty (although this difference is not statistically significant at the .10 level). This relationship does, nonetheless, parallel the interaction effect found in the case of the resources expectation. High efficacy faculty may view improvements and changes in the educational program as an opportunity for exercising influence in decision making and consequently place greater weight on this expectation than faculty with a low sense of efficacy. None of the other expectation variables showed statistically significant slope differentials between these two groups.

These findings lead us to two principal conclusions which may serve as working hypotheses for further inquiry. In evaluating the implications of collective bargaining:

1) low efficacy faculty in contrast to high efficacy faculty, place greater weight on those outcomes that impact either positively or negatively on extent of personal control;
2) high efficacy faculty, as compared to low efficacy faculty, place greater weight on those outcomes that relate to the opportunity to exercise control.

Further analysis might focus on the interaction of felt efficacy, expected changes in efficacy under collective bargaining, and the saliency of expectations regarding outcomes related to the exercise of control. That is, we would posit that low efficacy faculty who expect personal control to increase under collective bargaining will place substantially higher emphasis on expectations concerning increases in resources and other opportunities for influence than low efficacy faculty, who are also pessimistic as to the prospects for increased personal control under bargaining. This hypothesis derives from the literature on reactance and learned helplessness. It is argued (Staw, 1977) that individuals will react to a lack of control only if they have the expectation of exercising control in the situation; in the absence of such an expectation, individuals are apt to resign themselves to the absence of control if no avenues for escape from the situation exist (which suggests that organizational commitment may also serve as an intervening variable).

Interaction of Commitment and Expectation

The three stake/mobility categories we specified above are seen as defining levels of organizational commitment. That is, low stake/high mobility faculty are considered to be the least committed, while high stake/low mobility faculty are considered to be the most committed. High stake/high mobility faculty fall somewhere in between, but most likely lean toward the "high commitment" end of the scale, since they have relatively high investments in the organization. We hypothesized that high commitment faculty should assign greater weighting to expectations that relate to intrinsic rewards and the integrity of the organization than low commitment faculty; conversely, low commitment faculty are hypothesized to place greater weighting on the expected impact of bargaining on extrinsic rewards.

The interaction effect with respect to commitment and expected changes in extrinsic rewards is pronounced (Table 3). Low stake faculty place a very high weighting on this expectation, while the saliency of this expectation is not statistically significant for either of the high stake groups. Contrasts of the low stake group with both of the high stake groups indicated the difference to be statistically significant at the .05 level.

High stake faculty do put greater emphasis on the expected impact of collective bargaining on resource allocation to the CSUC than low stake faculty, but this difference is not statistically significant. However, the sign is as anticipated, since high commitment faculty would be expected to show greater concern with improving organizational performance and integrity and increased resources should serve as a means of facilitating such changes.

In contrast to our hypothesis, the expected impact of collective bargaining on the quality of educational programs does not vary with respect to saliency across these groups and the same holds for the expected impact of bargaining on personal efficacy. The expected impact of bargaining on the influence of the senate differs between the high and low stake groups (significant difference at the .05 level), but the direction of that difference is <u>opposite</u> to what is expected (i.e., low stake faculty place <u>greater</u> emphasis on this expectation than high stake faculty).

Our empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that low commitment faculty will view the expected impact of bargaining on extrinsic rewards as more important than will high commitment faculty. Our hypothesis concerning the interaction of commitment and intrinsic outcome expectations, however, is generally not supported. The rejection of the hypothesis may be explained in two ways. First, the process by which commitment is assumed to lead to changes in the cognitive structure may not be operative in this context. Second, professionalism may confound the effect. While there may exist a force from differential saliencies across levels of commitment for expected intrinsic outcomes of the forms we have described, the effect may be swamped by norms of professionalism applicable to both high and low commitment faculty. Professional norms and values would be expected to lead to high saliencies for various intrinsic rewards.

As a test of this hypothesis, further research should focus on the three-way interaction effect of commitment, expectations, and professional self-image. If professionalism is the confounding factor, then one should find that low commitment faculty with a weak professional self-image place less weight on intrinsic outcomes than do high commitment faculty with a weak professional self-image. However, faculty with strong pofessional self-image will weight intrinsic reward expectations the same across levels of commitment.

Faculty in the high commitment categories place greater weight on the equity of personnel decisions than do low commitment faculty (although the difference is not statistically significant). This interaction effect is supported by theory. As we argued previously, unions serve a kind of insurance function for employees of an organization, protecting them against arbitrary management policies threatening to an employee's status within the organization. Clearly, those with considerable stake in the organization have more to lose than those with a low stake; hence, the greater saliency of this expectation for tenured faculty.

Summary

We summarize our empirical findings with respect to the causal antecedents of support for bargaining as follows:

1. Personal efficacy has a significant main effect in the hypothesized direction.

2. The main effect of perceived mobility is significant and of the expected sign; there is no significant main effect for organizational stake.

3. In terms of the expected impact of collective bargaining, faculty place the greatest weightings on outcomes related to organizational integrity, intrinsic rewards, and equity in personnel practices. They place the least weighting on outcomes related to extrinsic rewards.

4. There are pronounced interaction effects between expectations and efficacy, as hypothesized.

5. There are some interaction effects between commitment and expectations. However, with the exception of the interaction between commitment and expected improvements in extrinsic rewards, the pattern of interaction effects does not support our hypothesized effect.

Footnotes

[1]This paper is based on research conducted within the Faculty Unionism Project at the Institute of Business and Economic Research, University of California, Berkeley, under a grant from the Carnegie Corporation. Joseph W. Garbarino is the project director.

[2]We use unstandardized regression coefficients (structural coefficients) as opposed to beta weights in order to make cross-group comparisons. Using beta weights for such comparisons would lead to erroneous conclusions if subgroup variances differ (Duncan, 1975).

[3]The statistical significance of an interaction effect is determined by use of a difference-of-means t-test. The test statistic for the hypothesis that there is no interaction effect for a given expectation (i.e., $b_{ik} = b_{ij}$) is:

$$t = (b_{ij} - b_{ik}) / \sqrt{Var(b_{ij}) + Var(b_{ik})}$$

where: b_{ij} = estimated regression coefficient for expectation i in category j;
b_{ik} = estimated regression coefficient for expectation i in category k;
$Var(b_{ij})$ and $Var(b_{ik})$ = variances of estimated parameters (standard error squared).

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TABLE 1

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: SUPPORT FOR BARGAINING WITH EFFICACY ORGANIZATIONAL STAKE, PERCEIVED MOBILITY, AND EXPECTED IMPACT OF BARGAINING

(n = 1226)

Variable	Partial Regression Coefficient	Partial F
Felt efficacy (1 = high; 0 = low)	-.54	81[a]
Perceived mobility (1 = high; 0 = low)	-.24	12[a]
Organizational stake (1 = tenured; 0 = nontenured)	-.03	0.13
Expectation that bargaining will:		
increase salaries	.10	4[b]
increase organizational conflict	-.17	8[a]
increase influence of outsiders	-.21	18[a]
decrease influence of the faculty senate	-.20	16[a]
increase equity of personnel decisions	.37	45[a]
increase personal efficacy	.21	14[a]
increase the allocation of resources to the CSUC from the state government	.49	68[a]
improve the quality of educational programs	.34	27[a]

Total F: 107[a]

R^2: .49

Adjusted R^2: .49

a=significant at .01 level
b=significant at .05 level

TABLE 2

INTERACTION OF FELT EFFICACY AND EXPECTED EFFECTS OF BARGAINING

Expected Impact of Bargaining on:	Within Group Regression Coefficients 1)High Efficacy (n = 573) b	(Std. Error)	2)Low Efficacy (n = 674) b	(Std. Error)	Difference
Salary	.12	(.08)	.09	(.07)	.03
Conflict	-.17	(.10)	-.15	(.07)	.02
Personal Influence	.11	(.09)	.33	(.07)	.22[a]
Outside Interference	-.12	(.07)	-.28	(.06)	.16[b]
Resource Allocation	.69	(.08)	.36	(.09)	.33[a]
Senate Influence	-.22	(.08)	-.17	(.06)	.05
Equity of Personnel Decisions	.37	(.08)	.35	(.07)	.02
Quality of Program	.41	(.10)	.27	(.08)	.14
F	54[a]		53[a]		
R^2	.43		.39		

a=significant at .01 level
b=significant at .05 level

TABLE 3

INTERACTION OF SOURCES OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT AND EXPECTED EFFECTS OF BARGAINING

Expected Impact of Bargaining on:	1) Low Stake/ High Mobility (n = 202)		2) High Stake/ High Mobility (n = 743)		3) High Stake/ Low Mobility (n = 277)		Intergroup Differences Groups: (1 & 2)	(1 & 3)	(2 & 3)
	Within Group Regression Coefficients								
	b	(Std. Error)	b	(Std. Error)	b	(Std. Error)			
Salary	.40	(.13)	.07	(.07)	.01	(.11)	.33[a]	.39[a]	.06
Conflict	-.35	(.15)	-.02	(.08)	-.23	(.11)	.33[a]	.12	.21[b]
Personal Influence	.36	(.15)	.21	(.08)	.36	(.10)	.15	.00	.15
Outside Interference	-.21	(.13)	-.15	(.07)	-.49	(.10)	.02	.28[b]	.34[a]
Resource Allocation	.40	(.15)	.56	(.08)	.60	(.12)	.16	.20	.20
Senate Influence	-.53	(.14)	-.17	(.06)	-.08	(.10)	.36[a]	.45[a]	.09
Equity of Personnel Decisions	.24	(.16)	.47	(.08)	.41	(.11)	.23	.17	.05
Quality of Program	.22	(.18)	.36	(.09)	.24	(.13)	.14	.02	.12
F	23[a]		73[a]		32[a]				
R^2	.49		.44		.49				